Three quick thoughts on Shevuot 26.

First, I don’t understand with, or perhaps agree with, the gemara’s suggestion of reversal of what is learned in a kelal / perat / kelal. The first explanation seems much stronger. Thus:

וְרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל דָּרֵישׁ כְּלָל וּפְרָט: ״אוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כִּי תִשָּׁבַע לְבַטֵּא בִשְׂפָתַיִם״ – כְּלָל, ״לְהָרַע אוֹ לְהֵיטִיב״ – פְּרָט, ״לְכֹל אֲשֶׁר יְבַטֵּא הָאָדָם״ – חָזַר וְכָלַל; כְּלָל וּפְרָט וּכְלָל – אִי אַתָּה דָן אֶלָּא כְעֵין הַפְּרָט; מָה הַפְּרָט מְפוֹרָשׁ – לְהַבָּא, אַף כֹּל לְהַבָּא.

And Rabbi Yishmael interprets the verse following the hermeneutical principle of a generalization and a detail: “Or if anyone take an oath clearly with his lips” (Leviticus 5:4), is a generalization; “to do evil, or to do good,” is a detail; “whatsoever it be that a man shall utter clearly with an oath,” the verse then further generalized. There is a hermeneutical principle that when a verse contains a generalization, and a detail, and another generalization, you may deduce that the verse is referring only to items similar to the detail. Just as the detail in the verse is explicitly an oath referring to the future, so too, all the oaths for which one is liable must be referring to the future.

אַהֲנִי כְּלָלָא, לְאֵתוֹיֵי אֲפִילּוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁאֵין בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה לְהַבָּא; אַהֲנִי פְּרָטָא, לְמַעוֹטֵי אֲפִילּוּ דְּבָרִים שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהֶן הֲרָעָה וַהֲטָבָה לְשֶׁעָבַר.

The generalization serves to include even those matters that do not concern doing evil or doing good when they refer to the future; the detail serves to exclude even matters that concern doing evil or doing good when they refer to the past.

אֵיפוֹךְ אֲנָא!

The Gemara challenges: I will reverse it and say that the generalization serves to include oaths concerning the past, and the detail serves to exclude matters that do not involve doing evil or doing good. Why is that not an equally legitimate interpretation of the verse?

The idea of a klal - prat - klal is not magic or arbitrariness. Even though it is a method of midrashic interpretation, it makes logical sense, in the way people interpret sentences. Even the US Supreme Court has interpretations which hinge on klal ufrat. See this parshablog post for more discussion / justification of this idea.

I went to the store and bought a whole bunch of produce: oranges, apples, grapes, melons - different crops.

I could have left it at produce. That I start enumerating individual items means that I am defining that original phrase “whole bunch of produce” and restricting it. But, if I continue with “different crops”, then apparently I did not mean to just restrict to the enumeration. Rather, these were examples, to illustrate the type of produce I meant.

There are three parts:

1. Generality — take an oath with his lips

2. Specific — to either do good or to do bad

3. Generality — for anything that a person will clearly utter

We are therefore looking for some characteristic or aspect of the enumerated items in (2) that they share in common. This would be that these are promises to act in the future. Doing good in the future or doing bad in the future are both about future actions. Therefore, that is the reason for the illustrative examples in (2), and (3) just shows that these are illustrative rather than comprehensive examples. And the particulars, that it is do act positively or negatively, as opposed to neutrally, is not the point.

But, how can you reverse it? The “bad” or “good” is not a shared aspect of the items in the enumerated list in (2) that we can point to while glossing over differences. And none of the items in the enumerated list in (2) actually shares an aspect of past.

This is me arguing against the Talmudic Narrator — or at least, the setup he establishes before it is pulled down by a named Amora, Rabbi Yitzchak; and claiming that my understanding of this hermeneutical principle is more correct. In other words, the Talmudic Narrator seems to assume it is magic / arbitrary, and so long as you can invoke klal / prat / klal and point to aspects to include / exclude, you can mix and match and combine them. And I am arguing that it works based on a careful analysis of words of the verse, and is an almost-peshat like analysis. After all, Rabbi Yishmael (vs. Rabbi Akiva) is often thought to be more peshat oriented in his analysis.

Second, Rav understands the difference between saying an incorrect statement and lying. Thus:

כִּדְרַב כָּהֲנָא וְרַב אַסִּי, כִּי הֲווֹ קָיְימִי מִקַּמֵּי דְּרַב, מָר אֲמַר: שְׁבוּעֲתָא דְּהָכִי אֲמַר רַב, וּמָר אָמַר: שְׁבוּעֲתָא דְּהָכִי אֲמַר רַב. כִּי אֲתוֹ לְקַמֵּיהּ דְּרַב, אֲמַר כְּחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ. אֲמַר לֵיהּ אִידַּךְ: וַאֲנָא בְּשִׁיקְרָא אִישְׁתְּבַעִי?!

The Gemara answers: It is as it was with Rav Kahana and Rav Asi, who, when they were standing up in the presence of Rav, their teacher, at the conclusion of a lesson, disagreed with regard to exactly what he said. One Sage said: On my oath Rav said like this, and the other Sage said: On my oath Rav said like that. When they came before Rav to clarify what he had said, he stated his opinion in accordance with what one of them had said. The other said to Rav: Did I then take a false oath?

אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לִבָּךְ אֲנָסָךְ.

Rav said to him: Your heart compelled you. It is not regarded as a false oath, since at the time that you took the oath you were certain that you were telling the truth.

Both Rav Kahana and Rav Asi I (of Hutzal) were absolutely certain that they had cited Rav correctly. And, it was troubling that their teacher / quasi-colleague was being misrepresented by the other, so much so that they even took an oath that their own interpretation was correct.

This does happen on occasion, that different Amoraim have different traditions of what the teacher said. It could be that one student was distracted; that the teacher said something as a hava amina / initial understanding that later parts of the discussion rejects; that the teacher changed his mind; or that the teacher said neither A nor B but a related statement C, which different students then interpreted / analyzed to arrive as either A or B.

But people can be wrong. Neither Rav Kahana nor Rav Asi was being wicked and trying to deceive. They were telling what they thought was the truth. And, that does not count as a false oath. It is an ones.

This is something that a lot of people miss in contemporary discourse. They claim that their ideological opponents, or specific politicians, are lying, when in many cases, they are really saying that they are incorrect.

Third, we see the laugher of the West.

״וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ״ – שֶׁנִּתְעַלֵּם מִמֶּנּוּ שְׁבוּעָה. יָכוֹל שֶׁנִּתְעַלֵּם מִמֶּנּוּ חֵפֶץ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בִּשְׁבוּעָה וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ״ – עַל הֶעְלֵם שְׁבוּעָה הוּא חַיָּיב, וְאֵינוֹ חַיָּיב עַל הֶעְלֵם חֵפֶץ.

§ The baraita teaches: The phrase “and it is hidden from him” teaches that one who was unaware of his oath, i.e., forgot it, and subsequently broke it, is liable to bring an offering. One might have thought that the oath taker is also liable when he broke the oath because he was unaware that a particular item is forbidden as the object of his oath; therefore, the verse states: “With an oath, and it is hidden from him.” He is liable for lack of awareness of the oath, but he is not liable for lack of awareness of the object of the oath.

מַחֲכוּ עֲלֵיהּ בְּמַעְרְבָא: בִּשְׁלָמָא שְׁבוּעָה – מַשְׁכַּחַתְּ לַהּ בְּלָא חֵפֶץ, כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל פַּת חִטִּין״, וּכְסָבוּר ״שֶׁאוֹכַל״ קָאָמַר – דִּשְׁבוּעֲתֵיהּ אִינְּשִׁי, חֶפְצָא דְּכִיר; אֶלָּא חֵפֶץ בְּלֹא שְׁבוּעָה, הֵיכִי דָּמֵי?

They laughed at this in the West, Eretz Yisrael, and said: Granted, you find lack of awareness of one’s oath without there being lack of awareness of the object of the oath, as in a case where one said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: I will eat wheat bread, as in that case his oath is forgotten and the object of it is remembered. But under what circumstances is there a case of lack of awareness of the object of the oath without lack of awareness of the oath itself?

כְּגוֹן דְּאָמַר: ״שְׁבוּעָה שֶׁלֹּא אוֹכַל פַּת חִטִּין״, וּכְסָבוּר ״שֶׁל שְׂעוֹרִים״ קָאָמַר – דִּשְׁבוּעֲתֵיהּ דְּכִיר לֵיהּ, חֶפְצָא אִינְּשִׁי. כֵּיוָן דְּחֶפְצָא אִינְּשִׁי לְהוּ, הַיְינוּ הֶעְלֵם שְׁבוּעָה!

The Gemara suggests: It can be found in a case where he said: On my oath I will not eat wheat bread, and he thought he had said: On my oath I will not eat barley bread, as in that case his oath is remembered by him and the object of it is forgotten. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Once the object of the oath is forgotten by him, that is a case of lack of awareness of his oath.

אֶלָּא אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: דָּא וְדָא אַחַת הִיא.

Rather, Rabbi Elazar said: The distinction made in the baraita between lack of awareness of one’s oath and lack of awareness of the object of one’s oath is not valid, and both this and that are one and the same.

Sanhedrin 17a provides identities for various descriptions, and one of them is that “They Laughed about it in the West” is Rabbi Eleazar (ben Pedat). The gemara there then challenges two identifications and flips them. But, I think this may be the source of the initial (and more correct) identification. This entire sugya is understood as a unified statement. Rabbi Eleazar laughed about it, and therefore said that the distinction is not valid. See my old post about the identity of the Laugher.

The Identity of the Laugher

Joshua Waxman

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February 14, 2024

The other day in daf Yomi, Bava Kamma 102b, we hear that Rabbi Yochanan staked out a position, and Rabbi Eleazar (ben Pedat) disagreed, for whatever reason. Thus,

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